




1/2023: Elections in Zimbabwe - No Change in Sight?

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Polling stations in Zimbabwe will open on 23 August. In addition to the presidency, parliament and local representatives are also up for election. The stakes are high - the country finds itself in an ongoing economic crisis and the political environment is tense as well. The presidential election will come down to a race between the incumbent Emmerson Mnangagwa of ZANU-PF on one side and presidential candidate Nelson Chamisa of the CCC on the other. In the run-up to the election, which is also regarded as a crucial indicator for the (future) orientation of the country's foreign policy, both parties appear confident of victory.

Background: The current situation


Zimbabwe is facing major economic and political challenges. The country's economy has been in an enduring crisis since the 2000s, exacerbated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine as well as climate change. Last year, economic growth in the landlocked southern African country plummeted by 5.5 percentage points compared to the previous year and it has not recovered since (Fig. 1).



This is compounded by the currency crisis the country finds itself in after years of dollarisation and de-dollarisation: the *Zimbabwe Dollar*, the national currency introduced in 2019, recorded a

521% depreciation against the US dollar last year, leading to hyperinflation - Zimbabwe's inflation

Figure 2: Annual inflation July 2022 - July 2023



rate is among the highest in the world (Fig. 2)


The situation is further exacerbated by huge increases in food and petrol prices as a result of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, the high informality of the Zimbabwean economy - it is estimated that around 80 - 90% of Zimbabweans work in the informal sector -, low levels of foreign investment and a foreign debt of around 14 billion US dollar, which is equivalent to around 67.7% of the country's GDP.¹ This has severe socio-economic consequences for the population (Fig. 3).

As a result, there is growing frustration among the population about the lack of services provided by the state, high prices for basic services, but also about weak democratic institutions. The military is closely intertwined with political processes and institutions, and the opposition and civil society accuse the country's elites of self-enrichment, corruption and mismanagement of public funds, while around 44% of the approximately 15.2 million inhabitants live in extreme poverty.²

This has repeatedly led to strikes and anti-government demonstrations in recent years, characterised by police and military crackdowns



on demonstrators and members of the opposition as well as arbitrary arrests of known opposition supporters and activists. Against this backdrop, general elections will be held in Zimbabwe on 23 August. In addition to the presidency, the parliament and local councils will also be up for election.



The frontrunners

Zimbabwe is a presidential republic; the president is both head of state and head of government, as well as commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces, the *Zimbabwe Defence Forces*. He appoints cabinet members and senior civil servants. Zimbabwe has a multi-party system; however, it has been consistently dominated by two parties: From 1980 to 1987, the ruling ZANU party and the largest opposition party, PF ZAP, dominated the political landscape. After the merger of the two parties to form the *Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front* (ZANU-PF), the *Movement for Democratic Change* (MDC) assumed the role of leading opposition party. In 2022, however, it was supplanted by the newly formed *Citizens Coalition for Change* (CCC). Although a total of eleven candidates – ten men and one woman – are running for president this year, it will come down to a race between the two leading candidates, Emmerson Mnangagwa (ZANU-PF) and Nelson Chamisa (CCC), and thus a rematch of the 2018 elections. Back then, Mnangagwa prevailed, winning 50.8% of votes in the first round compared to the 44% gained by Chamisa.

It is a battle of the generations. 80-year-old **Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa** is the incumbent president and leader of ZANU-PF. He has been part of the government in various positions since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. After the military forced his predecessor Robert Mugabe out of office in November 2017, Mnangagwa took over the reins of government. He and ZANU-PF enjoy the backing of the military and are particularly popular among the country's rural electorate and its military veterans. Accordingly, Mnangagwa, who is also known in Zimbabwe by the nickname „the crocodile“, frequently resorts to anti-imperialist rhetoric on the campaign trail, emphasising ZANU-PF's role in the struggle for independence.¹ Instead of making new campaign promises, Mnangagwa is focusing on highlighting his government's past successes. To this end, he points, among other things, to the strengthening of the agricultural sector, the construction of dams to secure agricultural water supplies, and the *Pfumvudza programme*, which was introduced in 2020 and provides households with seeds and fertiliser in order to help Zimbabwe regain food self-sufficiency. Other talking points include the improvement of the electricity supply through the construction of two new power plants, the government's efforts to expand solar energy, and the restoration of

petrol supplies after Zimbabwe had repeatedly struggled with petrol shortages in recent years. The sanctions policy of the US and the European Union (EU), which the government sees as the main culprit for the country's economic crisis, is another recurring theme in Mnangagwa's public appearances.



No one will stop us from ruling this country. We are the only party that brought independence and freedom to the colonized people of this country. We kicked out imperialism. [...] So you will be lost if you don't vote for ZANU-PF – you would have betrayed our freedom fighters.

Emmerson Mnangagwa

His strongest challenger is 46-year-old pastor and lawyer **Nelson Chamisa**. He entered the 2018 race for the presidency as leader of the *MDC Alliance*, a coalition of opposition factions. After internal leadership disputes, however, he split from the MDC. Chamisa then founded the

¹ <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/zimbabwe-ap-emmerson-mnangagwa-zanupf-harare-b2390435.html>



opposition party *Citizens Coalition for Change* (CCC) in January 2022, which successfully contested the March 2022 by-elections, de facto replacing the MDC as the main opposition party. However, the CCC faces enormous financial challenges. Following his exit from the MDC, Chamisa lost party assets as well as access to state party funding. Mnangagwa's much younger challenger is particularly popular among the young, urban and educated population. Campaigning under the slogan „For Everyone“, Chamisa promises to fight corruption, increase economic growth and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The official launch of the CCC's election manifesto, „A New Great Zimbabwe Blueprint“, took place on 8 August in Zimbabwe's second largest city Bulawayo, after previous planned campaign events had repeatedly been denied permission by local authorities and the police. Key points of the programme include economic reform within the framework of a society-wide dialogue, the temporary introduction of the US dollar as the main currency in order to build a stable and resilient national currency, debt restructuring, free access to primary education and basic health care, guarantee of food security and promotion of the agricultural sector, as well as reform and modernisation of the police.³

The dominance of the two leading candidates' parties is also apparent in the parliamentary election. A total of 637 candidates were registered for the 210 seats up for election in the National Assembly. Of these, only ZANU-PF and the CCC managed to field candidates in each of the 210 constituencies.⁴

Meanwhile, the outcome of the election remains uncertain. According to a survey by Afrobarometer, ZANU-PF would currently receive 35% of the vote, while the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change would get 27%; however, 34% of respondents did not want to comment or

said they were still undecided, making it difficult

Fig. 4: List of the candidates for the 2023 presidential election

Candidate	Party
Busha Joseph Makamba	FREEZIM Congress
Chamisa Nelson	Citizens for Change Coalition (CCC)
Chikohora Trust Tapiwa	Zimbabwe Coalition for Peace and Development (ZCPD)
Kasiyamhuru Blessing	Zimbabwe Partnership for Prosperity (ZIPP)
Madhuku Lovemore	National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)
Mnangagwa Emmerson Dambudzo	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU PF)
Mubaiwa Wilbert Archbald	National People's Congress (NPC)
Muzorewa Gwinyai Henry	United African National Council (The UANC)
Mwonzora Douglas Togarasei	Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Valerio Elisabeth	United Zimbabwe Alliance (UZA)
Wilson Harry Peter	Democratic Opposition Party (DOP)

Own illustration

- Notes:
- 1) Elisabeth Valerio, the only woman to enter the race, was only admitted after she appealed against her exclusion to the Electoral Court against her disqualification.
 - 2) Saviour Kasukuwere, the only independent candidate, was disqualified from the election by court action.
 - 3) Douglas Mwonzora (MDC-T) publicly withdrew his candidacy two weeks before the election; however, his withdrawal was not accepted, due to the failure to meet the three-week deadline.

to make an accurate prediction.⁵ Ultimately, however, there is reason to doubt the extent to which the will of the electorate will be decisive for the outcome, as will be demonstrated below.


The electoral process

A hybrid electoral system

In 2008, elections in Zimbabwe were harmonised, i.e. presidential elections, parliamentary elections and local elections now take place on the same day. The president is elected directly and must achieve an absolute majority in the first round. If none of the candidates is able to win more than 50% of the votes, a second round of voting takes place. For the elections on 23 August, this is scheduled for 2 October.

The **National Assembly** is the lower house of parliament will have a total of 280 seats. 210 of these seats, one per constituency, will be elected by simple majority. Of the remaining seats, 60 are reserved for women and, for the first time in this election, 10 are reserved for young people between the ages of 21 and 35 (Fig. 5).

The upper house of parliament, the Senate, has a total of 80 members, 60 of whom are directly elected and 16 of whom are appointed by traditional chiefs. In addition, two seats are reserved for persons with disabilities. The



President and Vice-President of the *Council of Chiefs* are also members of the Senate.

Entitled to vote are all Zimbabweans who are at least 18 years of age and are registered voters. However, Zimbabweans living abroad, estimated by the *Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency* (ZimStats) at around one million (2022) and by human rights organisations at around 5 million (30% of all Zimbabweans), are not allowed to vote, which the opposition sees as an advantage for the ruling party, as diaspora voters tend to support the opposition party.⁶

The critical role of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)

The *Zimbabwe Election Commission* (ZEC), which is responsible for conducting the elections, has for years been criticised for obstructing free and fair elections. This year is no different. Three of the six new commissioners appointed in 2022 are directly related to active or former ZANU-PF ministers; the Election Commission has also been accused of close ties to the military.⁷ There has also been criticism of the transparency and completeness of the voters' roll provisionally published by the ZEC, as well as delays in the publication of the current voters' roll and the final list of polling stations. Respectively, there is also a general mistrust among the population towards the ZEC. According to recent Afrobarometer surveys, just half of respondents (51%) have confidence in the electoral commission; 49% said that the publication of incorrect election results was likely.⁸

Opposition parties also accuse the ZEC of „gerrymandering“, i.e. changing the boundaries of constituencies and wards in favour of the ruling party. For example, a number of irregularities such as the creation of false coordinates, some of which are outside the country's borders, and

unjustified enlargements of constituencies were found in the delimitation process. This was concluded at the beginning of February and had already been five years overdue according to the constitution.⁹

Finally, the huge increase in nomination fees for candidates was met with widespread criticism. While registration fees for presidential candidates in 2018 were still 1,000 US dollar, this year the ZEC, with the approval of the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, set the nomination fees at 20,000 US dollar. Fees for National Assembly candidates increased from 50 US dollar to 1,000 US dollar, while the fees for party lists doubled from 100 US dollar to 200 US dollar.¹⁰ According to critics, these increases are a clear mechanism to exclude parties and candidates running independently or which/who have little or no state party funding.¹¹

Election observation


The elections on 23 August will be observed by numerous local, regional and international election observers. In general, international observer missions are considered to be more critical than regional election observation missions such as those of the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC). The EU, which was temporarily excluded from election observation under Mugabe and was only invited back under Mnangagwa for the last elections in 2018, is deploying an Election Observation Mission (EOM) consisting of a total of 150 members, including an 11-member core team, 46 long-term observers who have already been in Zimbabwe since late July and 44 short-term observers, as well as a delegation from the European Parliament and diplomats accredited to the Republic of Zimbabwe who will be deployed shortly before election day. The head of the EU-EOM is Italian MEP Fabio Massimo Castaldo.¹² The joint *African Union* (AU) and *Common Market for East and Southern Africa* (COMESA) election observation mission, AU-COMESA EOM, led by former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Uganda's former Prime Minister Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, consists of 73 short-term observers stationed in Zimbabwe from 16 - 29 August.¹³ The SADC EOM arrived in the country on 17 August.¹⁴ In addition, EOMs from various international and regional non-governmental and civil society



organisations, such as the *Carter Centre* (US) or the *Southern Africa Human Right Defenders Network*, 'Southern Defenders' are on the ground, as well as national election observers, of course. However, the election environment poses some challenges for the EOMs. For example, there was also a significant increase in accreditation fees for regional and international election observers (Fig. 6).

Critics also accuse President Mnangagwa of

Figure 6: Accreditation fees for election observers



Note: The AU, SADC, COMESA, electoral bodies and commissions, and embassy staff of African embassies are exempt from fees.

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
delaying the accreditation processes for the EU and *Carter Centre* EOMs in order to prevent a longer-term deployment of observers.¹⁵ Accusations from the ranks of ZANU-PF that foreign EOMs would take sides with the opposition and thus influence the electoral process complicate the climate.

Shrinking Spaces - The Media Landscape and Civil Society

Media

Although the situation of the media has improved slightly since Mnangagwa took office, interference and self-censorship are still widespread - and the upcoming elections have recently exacerbated the climate (Fig.7). Although there are also private and independent media and social media are growing, the media landscape remains dominated by the state-run media. Among the most important are the *Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation* (ZBC) and *Zimpapers*, which includes the state-owned newspaper *The Herald*.¹⁶ A clear bias can be seen in the media coverage of the elections. While state media mainly reports on the ruling

Figure 7: Press Freedom Index




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party's election campaign, private media tends to focus more on the opposition. The elections are also covered on social media, which is used as a campaigning platform by parties, too. However, these carry the risk of fake news; at the same time, only a fraction of the population has access to digital media and platforms: internet penetration in Zimbabwe is at just 34.8%; especially in rural areas, digital infrastructure is poorly developed.¹⁷ Added to this are comparatively high costs for mobile data volume.

Accordingly, as shown in a survey by Afrobarometer, radio is still considered the most important source of news in Zimbabwe.¹⁸ However, municipal radio stations are not allowed to report on in-depth political issues. In addition to elevated accreditation fees and complex procedures - media professionals have to be accredited by both the *Zimbabwe Media Commission* and the ZEC, which leads to double costs (Fig. 8) - it is particularly the *Cyber and Data Protection Act* introduced in 2022 and the *Criminal Law Codification and Reform Amendment Bill*, or *Patriotic Bill*, which came into

Figure 8: Accreditation fees for journalists for election coverage



Own illustration



force about two months before the elections, which pose enormous challenges to media freedom:

Cyber and Data Protection Act

The Cyber and Data Protection Act introduced new criminal penalties for online and social media speech, resulting in arrests of journalists and social media users who had made online comments critical of political figures or security officials. According to *Freedom House*, the fear of legal consequences for statements on the internet and social media could contribute to a considerable increase in self-censorship and, among other things, considerably impair reporting on the election and the proceedings on election day. Consequently, this would tremendously reduce the transparency of the elections and call into question the credibility of the results.¹⁹

Patriotic Bill

The introduction of the *Patriotic Bill* was met with an outcry both nationally and internationally. Paragraph 2 of the Bill introduced the offence of „wilfully violating the sovereignty and national interests of Zimbabwe“. Permanent residents of Zimbabwe, regardless of their nationality, can be prosecuted under the Act if they knowingly attend meetings where intervention, the undermining or overthrow of the government, or sanctions and trade boycotts are discussed or planned - or where these topics may be presumed to form part of the conversation.²⁰ Penalties vary depending on the objective of the meeting and can even include life imprisonment or the death penalty. The law, whose wording leaves a lot of room for interpretation, massively restricts freedom of the media, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. Of course, not only journalists are affected by this, but also civil society organisations and opposition parties, which strongly criticised the law.

Political and civil society space, which has already been restricted by new pre-election legislation, continues to shrink in the election process, according to *Human Rights Watch* - and with it, the environment for credible, free and fair elections.²¹ Campaign events by opposition parties have been repeatedly banned or disrupted by police and local authorities, and internet connectivity has been restricted during political

events. Although the situation in the country ahead of the elections has been mostly peaceful so far, there have been repeated incidents of harassment, arrests of opposition supporters, assault and violence. On 3 August, opposition activist Tinashe Chitsunge was murdered at an election rally.²²

Zimbabwe also has a long history of post-election violence, while the run-up to elections tends to be peaceful. For example, in a survey by Afrobarometer, 59% of respondents said they were afraid of violence during the election campaign, while 57% feared violence would erupt after the election results were announced.²³

Zimbabwe – a difficult partner?

German-Zimbabwean relations

The narrative of German-Zimbabwean relations is currently strongly influenced by the EU sanctions imposed in the wake of state farm expropriations and increasing human rights violations as well as restrictions on civil liberties in the early 2000s. Since then, the Zimbabwean government has blamed the sanctions imposed by the EU and the United States, which also imposed sanctions against the Mugabe regime at the same time, for the country's economic downward trend. This apportionment of blame is also widely echoed among the population.²⁴ Although both the EU and the US claim that the sanctions have no impact on trade relations, Zimbabwe has since lost access to loans from international financial institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank (WB) as a result of the sanctions.²⁵

Since 2013, Germany has followed the European policy of re-engagement, and further rapprochement occurred when Mnangagwa took office. Under the mantra „Zimbabwe is open for business,“ the Mnangagwa administration showed increased interest in improving relations and hoped to obtain a lifting of restrictions. Due to insufficient implementation of reforms and the continued restriction of civil liberties, e.g., through the above-mentioned Patriotic Bill, the EU has refused to lift the sanctions completely and only this year extended the existing sanctions against the *Zimbabwe Defense Industry* and the arms embargo.²⁶ Relations with the US, which in addition to being blamed




for the country's economic situation due to the sanctions is also accused of interfering in domestic affairs, e.g., by providing financial support to non-governmental organisations on the ground, are significantly worse.

Although Mnangagwa is much more diplomatic in his approach than his predecessor, Zimbabwe's anti-Western stance consequently persists and dominates relations with the US, the EU and Great Britain. In addition to sanctions, this is primarily due to the history of colonialism and the legacy of white supremacy, and is also rooted in the strong anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric of the ruling party and former independence movement ZANU-PF.

with 583.6 million US dollar in export volume (Fig.10).²⁸

Figure 10: Zimbabwe as a trading partner

Top 5 import partners 2022



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Top 5 export partners 2022




Global partners

Accordingly, in recent years Zimbabwe has increasingly turned to other partners, such as **China**. Relations between the two nations are friendly, as both sides are eager to emphasise. For example, China financed and built the new 200 million US dollar parliament building outside Harare as a "gift" to Zimbabwe.²⁷ Trade with China has been increasing rapidly since 2021 (Fig.9). For instance, the total trade volume with

In addition, China is the largest foreign investor in Zimbabwe, with about 1.3 billion US dollar in FDI flowing into the country from China in 2022. 295 million US dollar has been invested by the Chinese government and Chinese companies so far this year.²⁹ Investments are being made primarily in mining and infrastructure projects. Major construction projects include the *Arcadia Lithium Processing Plant* in Goromonzi, near the capital Harare, which was purchased by

the Chinese company *Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt*, one of the world's largest cobalt producers, in 2022 for 422 million US dollar. A further 300 million US dollar was invested in the rapid development of the mine and the construction of a processing plant for around 4.5 tons of lithium ore. According to *Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt*, the *Arcadia* mine is expected to produce 50,000 tons of lithium carbonate.³⁰ In total, 427 Chinese companies are registered in Zimbabwe, 228 of which are in the mining sector,

Figure 9: Trade with China



Own illustration

China stood at 1.7 billion US dollar in 2022, with China now being Zimbabwe's second largest import partner with 1.19 billion US dollar in import volume and third largest export partner



95 in manufacturing, 57 in services and 15 in construction.³¹

Russian companies have also become more involved in mining in recent years. However, **Russia** plays a rather minor role as a trading partner, with total trade volume in 2022 at just 28 Million US dollar. Among import partners, Russia ranks only 23rd, with fertilisers, aircraft and spacecraft, and grain among the top import products. At the *Africa-Russia Summit* in St. Petersburg this July, which was also attended by Mnangagwa, Russia's President Vladimir Putin announced plans to deliver up to 50,000 tons of free grain to Zimbabwe and other African nations within the next three months.³² Zimbabwe has so far abstained from UN General Assembly resolutions against Russia.³³

Since June of this year, Zimbabwe has been one of the newest members of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), which was founded in 2014 as an alternative to the WB and the IMF, and has thus gained access to loans. The Zimbabwean government also recently expressed interest in joining the BRICS group of states.³⁴

Potential for cooperation despite political challenges?

All in all, Zimbabwe is therefore not an easy partner from a German perspective. Nevertheless, the landlocked country in southern Africa and Germany have longstanding ties, and the country offers potential and opportunities for expanding cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere: The agricultural and farming sector has remained far below its potential in recent years due to failed reform policies. Considering global food security and improving resilience of agriculture to climate change, there is certainly potential for cooperation here. Promoting the agricultural sector and ensuring food self-sufficiency is also part of Zimbabwe's *Vision 2030* development agenda, which was presented by the government in 2018 and aims to make Zimbabwe the „breadbasket“ of southern Africa again.³⁵ The promotion and modernisation of agriculture also features prominently in the election manifesto of opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa.³⁶ In addition, Zimbabwe is rich in raw materials and possesses one of the world's largest deposits of lithium - an important

component of batteries that plays an increasingly central role, especially with regard to the energy transition. Meanwhile, the current Zimbabwean government is primarily interested in investing in the processing of lithium and other minerals such as platinum, chromium and copper and aims to create value chains in the country.³⁷

But there are also linkage points in the area of climate policy and renewable energies. The Kariba Dam, located on the border with Zambia, is the country's largest hydropower plant to date. The dam, which is owned equally by Zambia and Zimbabwe, is managed by the *Zambezi River Authority*, which is intended to prevent land use disputes. Further investments in hydropower, as well as the expansion of solar energy, are already being planned.

Furthermore, as in many African countries, Zimbabwe's population is very young: 62% are under 25 years old. Although the country is facing economic difficulties and public school teachers earn less than 200 US dollar per month, Zimbabwe's education system is still among the best in the region,³⁸ which presents a locational advantage for investment in the country. At the same time, in view of the shortage of skilled workers in Germany and new efforts by German policy-makers to counteract this shortage through the immigration of African skilled workers, Zimbabwe could be an attractive partner. However, a corresponding agreement, for example through models of circular migration and the creation of sustainable local jobs, should prevent the danger of brain drain, which has affected the country relatively severely. Since Brexit, for example, significantly more well-educated professionals have been migrating to the UK to fill the gaps that have arisen there.

Summary

There is much at stake for Zimbabwe in this year's elections: hyperinflation, the currency crisis, the impacts of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have hit the population hard. The highly polarised election campaign, the instrumentalisation of the judiciary and the recent incidents of violence against human rights



activists and opposition supporters show that the political space is increasingly narrowing and tension is rising. Many voters appear to be undecided and polls suggest that neither Mnangagwa nor Chamisa can garner more than 50% of the vote - so it could come down to a second round of voting on 2 October, although the uneven playing field in this campaign and the power that the government can exert on individuals and institutions responsible for implementing the election undermine the conditions for a free and fair election. A full one in two Zimbabweans fears electoral fraud and possible post-election violence. Regardless of the outcome of the elections, the political, economic and social challenges for the new government will be enormous.

The outcome will also be decisive for Zimbabwe's foreign policy in the coming years and will determine which partners the country will turn to in the future and to what extent. A change of political course with regard to Germany and the EU seems doubtful in the event of an election victory for the ruling party.

Moreover, if the authoritarian domestic political course continues, considering an easing of the EU sanctions will be difficult. Nevertheless, dialogue should not be completely broken off, as there are a number of linkage points for intensifying bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic and climate policy fields, where overlaps between German and Zimbabwean interests are evident. Pursuing these through the implementation of concrete projects could also contribute to an improvement of the Zimbabwean economy and the socio-economic situation of the population and, in the long term, to an opening of the political and civil society spaces - as long as this is allowed by the political elites.

Note: Part of this Afrikapost aktuell is based on conversations conducted with people on the ground.



Endnoten

- 1 <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-economic-outlook>
- 2 <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-economic-outlook#:~:text=The%20extreme%20poverty%20rate%20was,coefficient%20was%200.503%20in%202023;https://www.zimstat.co.zw/>
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- 16 <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/AD660-Most-Zimbabweans-want-free-media-as-watchdog-over-government-Afrobarometer-27june23.pdf>
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