The military escalation between Israel, the US and Iran is also sparking intense debate in the African media and political discourse. While many African governments choose cautious and diplomatic language in their official statements and avoid taking a clear stance in favour of any of the three main parties to the conflict (Press Review CW 10/2026), a glance at the African media landscape reveals different framings of the military conflict even in the choice of words. Whereas some media outlets describe the conflict in relatively neutral terms as the “Iran-Israel conflict” or an “escalation in the Middle East”, others use significantly more political or actor-specific phrasing. For instance, state press agencies in North Africa, such as the Algerian Press Service or Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, speak of “American-Zionist attacks” or “US-Zionist attacks against Iran”. Algeria’s state radio also speaks of “American-Zionist aggression”. It is striking that, although the major Algerian daily newspapers do report on the Iranian counter-attacks on the capitals of the Gulf states, they do not describe these as “aggression.”
In Egypt, the major daily newspapers Al-Ahram (state-owned) and Al-Masry Al-Youm (privately owned) refer to the “US-Israeli war against Iran”. Hespress, a private Moroccan online news platform, is somewhat more cautious in its choice of terminology and describes the developments predominantly as the “Iran-Israel conflict” or “war in the Middle East” – phrases also used, for example, by the Kenyan newspapers The Star and The EastAfrican. West African media, such as the Nigerian media portal THISDAYLIVE or Daily Trust, on the other hand, refer to the “US-Israel-Iran war” or the “war between the US, Israel and Iran”, whilst South Africa’s Mail & Guardian, for example, predominantly uses terms such as “Iran war” or “Iran-Israel conflict”.
Economic impact on African countries
International trade routes and global energy markets in particular are already feeling the tangible effects of the Iran war. Iran is now blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital for maritime trade; reports also suggest that mines have been laid there. Around a fifth of the world’s oil shipments pass through this chokepoint. The Bab-al-Mandab strait into the Red Sea is also considered high-risk due to the regionalisation of the war. Due to the increased security risks, ships must now divert to longer and, in some cases, more challenging trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope, which extends transit times and increases costs. This simultaneously raises the risk of delivery delays and supply bottlenecks – not only for oil, but also for goods such as grain and fertilisers.
Uncertainty over transport routes, combined with attacks on refineries in the Gulf states, has already led to a significant rise in crude oil prices, with Brent crude at times reaching levels of around or above 100 US dollars per barrel. Oil-producing African nations such as Nigeria, Angola and Ghana stand to benefit from the rise in crude oil prices: higher export revenues improve their current account balances and increase fiscal flexibility. According to Bloomberg Economics, Angola could improve its current account balance by several percentage points of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) if high prices persist. For countries such as Nigeria, which have limited refining capacity and rely on imported refined products, the rise in world market prices has a direct impact on domestic prices. In Nigeria, for example, petrol prices rose by around 35% in February 2026 compared with the previous year. Net energy importers such as Egypt and Uganda are also feeling the effects immediately. In Egypt, according to reports from the Ministry of Energy, petrol prices rose by around 22% in March 2026, which in turn is putting additional pressure on Egypt’s ailing economy. Consequently, Egypt has already held talks with the European Union, the US and international financial institutions to cushion the economic impact of the war. In Uganda, too, higher import costs for diesel and petrol are already driving up transport and production costs.
Despite the noticeable price rises and the uncertainties in the energy markets, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has so far been relatively cautious in her assessment of the conflict’s impact on Africa. In a brief video statement to BBC News Africa, she explained that many African countries have so far been less directly affected by the conflict, as they have only limited trade links with the main parties to the war. At the same time, she highlighted the continent’s long-term economic potential and described its population of around 1.4 billion people as one of Africa’s key strengths. Nevertheless, the economic consequences for African states cannot be dismissed; they vary greatly from region to region. As the examples of Egypt, Nigeria and Uganda show, states whose trade routes are heavily dependent on the Gulf region or whose economies are heavily influenced by the oil trade are particularly affected.
One often overlooked aspect of economic impact is labour migration and the associated flow of remittances. Many Africans, particularly from North and East Africa, are employed in the Gulf region, and a significant proportion of their earnings flows directly back into their home economies. This is illustrated, for example, by the case of Kenya. According to official figures, around 500,000 Kenyans live in the Middle East, most of them in Saudi Arabia (approx. 300,000), the United Arab Emirates (60–80,000), Qatar (approx. 70,000) and Oman (4–5,000). Saudi Arabia is Kenya’s third-largest source of remittances worldwide. According to the Kenyan central bank, around 302.1 million US dollars in remittances flowed from Saudi Arabia to Kenya in 2025; in 2024, the figure stood at 403.12 million US dollars. Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East therefore affect African economies not only through energy prices or changes in import/export conditions, but also through social and labour market links between Africa and the Gulf states.
Peace and security
In terms of security policy, too, the Iran war could have a major impact on the African continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa. The region is of strategic importance as it lies along key trade routes in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab and connects Africa with the Middle East. In recent years, the Gulf states in particular, but also Israel and Turkey, have expanded their involvement in the Horn of Africa – politically, economically and militarily. The region is characterised by a wide range of security challenges, including long-standing internal conflicts, tensions between neighbouring states and the complex interplay of external actors, which could now be exacerbated by the Iran war.
According to observers, one acute risk factor is the possible entry of the Iran-backed Houthi rebels from Yemen as a major belligerent. They could carry out targeted attacks on bases belonging to Gulf states, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) military base in Berbera, Somaliland, or the US military base Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which could see the war spill over onto African soil for the first time. These fears are exacerbated by reports that Israel is already investigating potential bases in Somaliland from which to conduct reconnaissance and security operations against the Houthis. Only last year, Israel became the first UN member state to recognise Somaliland – a de facto autonomous region claimed by Somalia – as a sovereign state, leading to considerable tensions in the region. Observers also assume that Israeli forces are already on the ground and are using the UAE’s military base in Berbera. Whilst some analysts, such as Abdulghani al-Iryani of the Sanaa Centre for Strategic Studies, consider direct Houthi involvement in the war to be rather unlikely, Houthi representatives have already warned on several occasions that that any kind of Israeli military presence in Somalia would be regarded as a provocation – a threat echoed by the Iran-aligned Somali militia al-Shabaab.
In Sudan, the war with Iran could influence the dynamics of the ongoing civil war. Whilst the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohammed Hamdan ‘Hemeti’ Daglo are supported by the UAE, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah Burhan are backed by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the SAF had only resumed relations with Tehran in 2023 and has since expanded its cooperation with Iran. According to reports, Iran is said to have supplied the SAF with drones, in particular – experts consider it almost certain that Iran will no longer be able to do so. Should the other Gulf states also shift their focus more towards their own region as the Middle East conflict escalates, this could reduce their external support – such as the supply of weapons and other military equipment, cooperation in the field of military training, or logistical support – for both sides of the conflict. At present, observers believe that neither side has sufficient resources to deal a decisive blow to the other, meaning that the civil war could drag on. Other analysts, however, consider the impact of the war with Iran to be relatively minor, at least as far as the UAE’s role in Sudan is concerned. Even if the war with Iran were to absorb the Emirates’ political attention, the networks with the RSF are so well established that the RSF’s supply chains would not be affected. Whether and what impact the war with Iran might have on the mediation process of the so-called Quad Initiative, comprising the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, remains to be seen and has so far been neglected in the discussions.
In addition to the war in Sudan, security in the Horn of Africa is shaped by further regional tensions and unresolved border and influence disputes – such as those between Ethiopia and its neighbours Eritrea and Somalia, or the dispute over the status of Somaliland. Here too, a potential reduction in the Gulf states’ involvement due to the Iran war could exacerbate existing tensions – or, conversely, lead to (temporary) easing of tensions. Somalia, for example, accuses the UAE of having actively supported Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and, as a result, last month terminated all cooperation with the Emirates in favour of new security cooperation with Saudi Arabia. A withdrawal by the UAE in the wake of the Iran war could therefore contribute to a certain degree of détente in the region. At the same time, should Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic influence wane, Ethiopia might be tempted to press ahead with its self-defined claim to access to the Red Sea through the memorandum of understanding signed with Somaliland in 2024 (Press Review CW 2/2024), which in turn could lead to an escalation of tensions. Turkey, in particular, would benefit from a withdrawal by the Gulf states, as it could further expand its involvement in the Horn of Africa and position itself as a stabilising force. However, according to experts, whether and to what extent the Gulf states might withdraw from the region depends heavily on how long the Iran war lasts.
The Iran war could also have indirect security implications for the Sahel and neighbouring parts of West Africa. Iran has recently expanded its contacts with Sahel states such as Niger, including through a security cooperation agreement on collaboration on border and counter-terrorism issues; Niger has also acquired drones from Iran. Media reports have moreover suggested secret negotiations regarding the delivery of 300 tonnes of uranium from Niger to Iran, though there is no official confirmation of this. Meanwhile, the escalation in the Middle East could further strain the security situation in other parts of West Africa, particularly in Northern Nigeria, where there has recently been an increase in coordinated attacks by Islamist groups on military bases and civilians. Militant Islamist groups could thus use the Iran war for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Experts also warn that US personnel and equipment, which are currently operating alongside Nigerian armed forces against these groups, could come under increased scrutiny in such a context, even though no direct attacks resulting from the Iran war have been documented so far.
It remains to be seen how the dynamics of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and West Africa will develop as a result of the Iran war. The coming months are likely to reveal whether the conflict will bring primarily economic challenges for the African continent, or whether it will also give rise to new security dynamics. The duration and scale of the Iran war will be decisive, but so too will the foreign policy priorities set by external actors and the new opportunities for tension or cooperation that arise as a result.